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Abstract 
There has been little research examining executives who change jobs by specifically 
following these individuals both before and after their employer changes. By incorporating 
research on the boundaryless career [Arthur, M. B., & Rousseau, D. M. (Eds.). (1996). The 
boundaryless career: A new employment principle for a new organizational era. New York: 
Oxford University Press; Sullivan, S. E., & Arthur, M. B. (2006). The evolution of the 
boundaryless career concept: Examining physical and psychological mobility. Journal of 
Vocational Behavior, 69, 19–29] and applying Frank’s theory of relative standing (1985), this 
study examined factors that may cause executives to change jobs in the context of 
managing their careers. Our findings revealed that factors, such as age and compensation, 
were related to the likelihood of job movements as well as declining organizational health. 
Post-hoc analyses also indicated that executive job-changers received significantly greater 
increases in total compensation and were more likely to receive increases in organizational 
status. 
1. Introduction 
Similar to research in the turnover and selection literatures, studies of executives have 
examined movements across organizations from the organizations’ point of view (Boeker, 1997; Gunz & 
Jalland, 1996; Sullivan, 1999). This approach, however, only reveals one perspective on executives. 
Executives are not simply organizational resources. As suggested in the boundaryless career model 
(Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Sullivan & Arthur, 2006), they are also individuals who seek to manage their 
own careers by taking advantage of opportunities to maximize their success (Eby, Butts, & Lockwood, 
2003; Judge, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1994; Judge, Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). The present research 
examined the job movements of executives across organizations (compared to a sample of non-moving 
executives) in the context of boundaryless careers. We sought to explicate the factors associated with 
the likelihood of executives making firm changes versus remaining with their organizations. 
The boundaryless career refers to the notion that today’s professionals manage their own 
career paths, as they seize new and often different job opportunities to obtain training, enhance their 
human capital, and remain marketable (Arthur, Khapova, & Wilderom, 2005; Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; 
Sullivan & Arthur, 2006). Thus, rather than remain with one organization and line of work over the 
course of their careers, individuals self-manage their careers by autonomously capitalizing on new 
opportunities that they believe will provide them with valued returns in exchange for performance. In 
doing so, these professionals cross-over both physical and psychological boundaries, whereby they 
actually move between organizations (i.e., physical boundaries) and/or believe they have the capacity to 
move across boundaries (i.e., psychological boundaries). This is because individuals’ relationships with 
their organizations are transactional and exchange-based (Blau, 1964) and their obligations to their 
organizations are short-term, indefinite, and both performance and contractually oriented (McLean 
Parks, Kidder, & Gallagher, 1998). Professionals continuously evaluate how well their organizations are 
meeting their stated and implied contractual obligations, as well as the perceived availability of better 
opportunities in the marketplace (Rousseau & Wade-Benzoni, 1994). As a result, some individuals may 
have multiple careers and multiple job movements during their lifetime (Sullivan & Arthur, 2006). 
Research on boundaryless careers indicates that both intrinsic and extrinsic factors influence 
career choice decisions. However, much attention has been paid to describing the type and impact of 
intrinsic factors (e.g., Arthur, Inkson, & Pringle, 1999). There has been little examination of executive 
careers and the relationship that exists between extrinsic factors (e.g., pay and status) and executives’ 
organizational mobility. Research in executive compensation (e.g., Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Judge et 
al., 1995; Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1999) has implicitly assumed the importance of extrinsic 
factors in executive attraction and retention, but little research has focused on how extrinsic factors 
relate to executive career management. 
The present study examined if these more extrinsic factors do—and more specifically to what 
extent they do—influence executives as they change firms. We argue that some executives are 
continually determining if other job opportunities will enable them to differentially obtain or maintain 
valued extrinsic job factors. Although we anticipate finding similar results between the typical employee 
and the contemporary executive in their mobility patterns, previous research has not examined 
executive-mobility from this point of view. While there is research that examines the propensity of 
individuals to switch careers (i.e., Donohue, 2007; Holland, 1996), as well as research focused on the 
determinants of extrinsic career success (see Ng, Eby, Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005, for a review), work 
has not considered executive’s job patterns, including possible reasons for them, and how these 
patterns reflect an executive’s career. Indeed, researchers examining mobility and the boundaryless 
career have called for more studies evaluating career patterns across organizational boundaries (Briscoe 
& Hall, 2006; Sullivan & Arthur, 2006). By identifying factors that may influence the executive employer 
changes, the present study concentrates on executives as individuals with careers, rather than 
organizational resources. In doing so, we provide insight into today’s career management models, 
specifically the boundaryless career model, as well as address the call for a fuller understanding of 
today’s employment relationships, as executives strive to achieve career success (Sullivan, 1999). 
1.1. Career Success at the Executive Level 
Described as ‘‘the positive psychological or work-related outcomes or achievements one has 
accumulated as a result of one’s work experiences’’ (Judge et al., 1995: 486), career success includes 
both subjective and objective components. Intrinsic, subjective factors that have been highlighted 
include opportunities to perform challenging work, experience greater mobility across organizations, 
and develop supportive networks around work (Arthur et al., 2005; Eby et al., 2003; Heslin, 2005). Yet, 
while obtaining a sense of satisfaction with one’s chosen work is certainly critical, so too is receiving 
adequate extrinsic rewards in exchange for the work. From a more objective and measurable 
perspective, extrinsic rewards, including pay and status, often act as central determinants of career 
success, so much so they have been used as dependent variables in many studies (Heslin, 2005; Judge et 
al., 1994; Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001). 
Nowhere are the issues of extrinsic rewards, and compensation to be specific, more salient then 
at the executive level. Because their specific forms of human capital are argued to directly influence firm 
performance, executives receive significantly greater total compensation than other employees (Harris 
& Helfat, 1997; Leo, 1995). Research suggests that for CEOs, external forms of career success, such as 
compensation and status, are important; for example, pay has been shown to affect CEOs’ decisions to 
seize job opportunities (e.g., Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Lubatkin et al., 1999). In fact, the recent high 
levels of executive turnover and the public nature of executive compensation, suggest that movements 
between organizations may provide a fluid market for executives to advance and obtain career success. 
Accordingly, this study examined whether some executives, in the hopes of achieving career success, 
have a tendency to change organizations while managing their careers. As discussed in the following 
section, this tendency is expected to be influenced by individual characteristics, job characteristics, and 
organizational factors. 
1.2. Correlates of Executive Employer Changes 
1.2.1. History of firm changes 
Contemporary mobility research, which often focuses on samples of middle management or on 
individual career challenges within organizations (Boeker, 1997; Robson, Wholey, & Barefield, 1996; 
Veiga, 1983), typically is based on models which describe the stages within one’s career (e.g., Levinson, 
1986; Schein, 1978; Super, 1957; Veiga, 1983). While these models differentiate each stage by the 
individual’s age and career life cycle, they also suggest that employer changes are caused by more than 
simply career stage; that is, certain individual characteristics are related to job movements, and some 
individuals are simply more inclined to make job movements than others. So too, in arguing the 
boundaryless career concept, researchers (i.e., Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Sullivan, 1999; Sullivan & 
Arthur, 2006) have suggested that individual characteristics affect the likelihood of employer changes. 
Some have argued that there exists an underlying individual-level construct, propensity to 
move, which captures this phenomenon (e.g., Judge & Watanabe, 1995; Veiga, 1983). A few studies 
have examined previous mobility as a predictor for future mobility across organizations (e.g., Forbes, 
1987; Judge &Watanabe, 1995; Stewman & Konda, 1983; Veiga, 1983), specifically arguing that the 
propensity to move, measured in such ways as number of jobs (Forbes, 1987) and length of tenure in 
one’s first job (Veiga, 1983), is related to the likelihood of future job movements (or at least turnover). 
For all of these reasons, we can expect that past behavior of employer changes relates to future 
employer changes. Therefore, we predict 
Hypothesis 1: Executive history of firm changes relates positively to the probability of executive firm 
changes. 
1.2.2. Compensation 
One external factor likely to influence executives’ career choices is compensation. Frank’s theory 
of relative standing (1985) helps explain why this factor may be relevant. This economic-based theory 
suggests that executives consider new job opportunities based on their perception of their relative 
standing (i.e., compensation and rank within the organization) compared with other individuals within 
the same company or similar individuals within the same industry. Thus, executives may consider career 
changes to improve their pay or status. Frank (1985) argues that individuals examine their compensation 
in comparison with their proximate social setting. Reference groups may be described locally within a 
particular organization or more globally within a particular industry. However, executives are more likely 
to extend their reference groups to include outside executives within the same industry, since 
executives are typically a minority within their own organizations. In addition, executive-level pay and 
status are often public information, enabling executives to easily form a reference group that extends 
well-beyond their organizations. 
The theory of relative standing suggests that executives would be likely to leave their 
organizations to improve their comparative pay status only if they perceive their compensation to be 
relatively lower than those in their reference group. As a result, compensation is an effective tool for 
their retention. Through its effects on calculative commitment, (i.e., individuals remain with their 
organizations because the benefits of remaining are higher than the costs of staying) (Kanter, 1968; 
Meyer & Allen, 1991, 1997), higher pay can serve as an effective means of employee retention (Trevor, 
Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997). The logic is that if executives view their contributions and associated 
rewards as equitable, in an exchange-mentality (Blau, 1964; Etzioni, 1961), they remain with their 
organizations because their compensation is higher than what they could receive elsewhere (Farrell & 
Rusbult, 1981; Randall & O’Driscoll, 1997). While executives may switch organizations to increase their 
total compensation relative to their peers in other organizations, it is also likely that if they are currently 
receiving a comparatively higher pay than those in their reference group, then they are more likely to 
remain at their organizations. Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 2: Compensation relates negatively to the probability of executive firm changes. 
1.2.3. Status 
The theory of relative standing (Frank, 1985) also provides a theoretical basis for the argument 
that executives compare their individual-status with those of their peers within and across 
organizations. Status, just as pay, can be used as a way to retain employees. Indeed, organizational 
status can be viewed as a form of reward from a total compensation perspective (Milkovich & Newman, 
2005). It can also be viewed as a measure of career success (Judge et al., 1994). Even if he or she is paid 
adequately (or inadequately), his or her status within an organization and the wider professional 
community may enhance the positive effect or offset the negative effect attributable to pay. Thus, we 
predict: 
Hypothesis 3: Status within an organization relates negatively to the probability of executive firm 
changes. 
1.2.4. Organizational health 
In addition to individual compensation and status, organizational factors such as downsizing and 
decline have been recognized as a potential cause of executive career movement (Bedeian & Armenakis, 
1998; Bruton, Keels, & Shook, 1996). Based on Frank’s (1985) theory of relative standing, individuals in 
declining organizations may compare their organizational status to more successful companies within 
their industry and seek to fill that ‘‘gap’’ by changing jobs to a more reputable organization. In addition, 
executives who know of possible decline in their organization may seek other job opportunities in order 
to increase their individual performance status within another organization (Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; 
Lubatkin et al., 1999). Thus, executives in declining organizations may seek jobs in organizations with 
higher (or stable) performance to improve their pay and status. Therefore, we expect organizational 
performance to relate to the probability of executive job movements, or: 
Hypothesis 4: Decreases in organizational health relates positively to the probability of executive firm 
changes. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Sample and procedure 
Data were collected for executives who left one organization and began a job in another 
organization during the time frame 1992–1997. Initially, we examined the sample of executives reported 
in the ExecuComp database (Standard & Poor’s, 1999). This database contains information on the top 
five paid executives in over 1700 organizations, and there are approximately 9000 individuals in the 
original database. The database provides financial information for the organizations, as well as 
information regarding top executives for the years 1992–1997. Information provided for the top 
executives included reported title and compensation such as salary, bonus, and long-term 
compensation. Furthermore, information for the organization in the ExecuComp database included 
sales, number of employees, return on assets (ROA), and return to shareholder. 
The sample included numerous executives with multiple listings in the original database that 
were identified with a personal identification code; this indicated an executive moving from one 
organization to another organization. Since our focus was on executives leaving one organization to 
begin a job in a new organization, we examined the data to identify these ‘‘movers.’’ First, we sorted the 
data to determine which executives changed companies within the original database. We then selected 
records in which the same individual worked in two or more different organizations. This initial cut of 
our data reduced our sample to a set of 380 executives. However, not all of these records necessarily 
signified a job movement across organizations. That is, many of the data records of executives were 
eliminated from our study because their companies had simply changed names, merged, been acquired 
by another company, or the individual had been promoted to a parent company. Because our focus was 
on job movers, we wanted to examine those individuals who left one organization and began 
employment in another organization. This refinement of the data yielded a sample size of 91 movers. 
For each mover, necessary data was obtained from the ExecuComp database (to be detailed 
below). However, the hypotheses required more information than contained in this single database. For 
each executive, a biographical search was conducted to gather additional information not provided 
within the ExecuComp database. Thus, for each individual, additional information needed for this study 
(age, education level, number of previous jobs, and tenure for the current job) was obtained. This 
information was obtained through a variety of secondary sources such as various news releases, 
organizations’ annual reports, Standard & Poor’s Register of Corporate Executives, and Who’s Who in 
Finance and Industry. During the search for biographical information, we verified whether the executive 
actually changed jobs to a new organization. Searches were also conducted through the Internet and 
more specifically through company web sites. The reader should note that we needed to rely on these 
secondary sources of data for their accuracy. While we could confirm a significant portion of the data 
from multiple sources (e.g., a press release, Who’s Who, the company website, etc.), it is likely that the 
company itself was responsible for providing the information to each of these sources. That said, any 
error (purposeful or accidental) on the company’s part for providing this data should only create error in 
our analyses, and thus should only serve to weaken our results. 
For comparison purposes, we also needed a sample of non-movers. Although the ExecuComp 
database provides a wealth of data on other executives, the requirements of data collection from the 
additional sources necessitated that a smaller sample be employed so that the requisite additional 
information be feasibly collected. Thus, we collected data on a comparison group of 91 non-movers. We 
randomly selected one executive from each of the organizations represented by our initial set of 91 
movers (i.e., from the organization in which the mover left). We then sought to collect the additional 
necessary data from the secondary sources. Due to some cases where personal information was not 
available on these non-movers (non-movers were less likely to be reported in press releases) and our 
desire to maintain random selection (in case there were relationships between the availability of data 
and other characteristics relevant to our study), our final data set contained complete data on 91 
movers and 87 non-movers. 
2.2. Measures 
2.2.1. History of Firm Changes 
Using data compiled from the various biographical sources, we determined the number of 
companies each executive had held since graduation from college or completion from high school. The 
use of counting prior employers as a measure for an individual’s propensity to move has been used in 
previous mobility studies (Forbes, 1987; Veiga, 1983). However, as we did not know the reason for the 
firm changes, we took the more conservative approach of simply labeling this measure as a history of 
firm changes. The count of firm changes did not include any firm changes that occurred over our data 
collection window. The measure of number of past employers was taken for each executive as of 1992. 
In other words, ‘‘movers’’ in our study did not automatically receive a higher level on this measure. 
2.2.2. Compensation 
Compensation for each executive was obtained from the ExecuComp database for the years 
1992–1997. This includes salary, bonus, and two measures for total compensation. Because different 
forms of compensation have different purposes and therefore potentially different effects (Milkovich & 
Newman, 2005), we considered each component of pay separately. Our analyses included salary, bonus, 
and other compensation (generally, this means long-term compensation and/or stock options, awards, 
and grants). The first measure of total compensation included an executive’s salary, bonus, other annual 
compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black– 
Scholes formula), long-term incentive payouts, and all other compensation. The second measure 
included all of the same measures except it does not provide the total value of stock options granted 
using Black–Scholes; instead, the net value of stock options exercised is provided. We subtracted salary 
and bonus from both measures of total compensation. However, only one of the measures was used in 
analyzing an executive’s compensation package. Thus, if the first measure was not available for a 
particular year, then the second measure was used as a proxy. The two measures of total pay are highly 
related (r = .63). As listwise deletion has been shown to potentially bias data analyses (Roth, 1994), the 
use of the alternate variable for total compensation was a useful estimate. It is worth noting that while 
the measures of total compensation are highly correlated, the relationship is not perfect. Thus, we 
tested the robustness of our results by redoing our analyses using both alternate measures (Analyses 
are available from the authors upon request). Interestingly, there were no notable changes in the results 
(thus also indicating that listwise deletion would not have biased our results). In addition, since the data 
on total compensation was highly skewed, we used a natural logarithm to make its distribution more 
normal. 
2.2.3. Status within the Organization 
Following past research, executives were defined as individuals reporting to the chief executive 
of the firm (Boeker, 1997). An executive’s rank was provided within the ExecuComp database as 
reported by the company annually. However, to determine a change in status for the executive, the 
authors developed a hierarchical ranking system for executive status. Each executive’s title was 
examined over the 5-year period to determine any change in hierarchical status. Executives were ranked 
as follows: 
5 = Chairperson of the board, Chief Executive Officer, and/or President. 
4 = Chief Executive Officer and/or President. 
3 = Chief Operating Officer and/or Chief Financial Officer. 
2 = Executive Vice President and/or Senior Vice President. 
1 = Vice President and/or Treasurer. 
2.2.4. Organizational health 
According to Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986), multiple performance measures should be 
used to determine an organization’s health. Financial and market measures were provided through the 
ExecuComp database for each company. ROA, an accounting based measure of performance, is 
commonly used as an organizational performance measure (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Li & 
Simmerly, 1998). We also used a market measure of Return to Shareholder that includes total return 
and monthly reinvestment of dividends. To analyze the organization’s health during the 5-year period, 
we used the change in both ROA and return to shareholder investment from the previous year in each 
year. 
2.2.5. Employee movement 
Dummy variables (0 = non-mover, 1 = mover) were used to signal whether an executive was a 
mover or a non-mover within the data. An executive was identified as a mover at the end of the same 
year in which the executive moved. 
2.2.6. Other variables 
Age, education level, current tenure with the organization, and organizational size were also 
collected for use in our analyses. Prior studies have shown executive compensation to be correlated 
with firm size (Boyd, 1994; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997). Organizational size may also be related to 
advancement opportunities; therefore, a measure for size (the number of employees within the 
organization) was entered as a control variable. An individual’s age as well as education level may also 
be associated with the executive’s career stage (Callister, Kramer, & Turban, 1999; Veiga, 1983). Note 
that we considered gender, but only three of the 178 subjects were women. Because of the small size of 
this subgroup, and the resultant likelihood that a dummy variable would capture spurious variance, we 
did not control for gender in our analyses. 
2.3. Analyses 
To estimate the influence of the independent variables on the probability of employee job 
movements, we estimated a proportional hazards rate model (Cox, 1972), thus treating data on tenure 
with a given organization as survival time. The proportional hazards model has previously been applied 
in organizational research in studies of employee turnover (e.g., Judge & Watanabe, 1995; Morita, Lee, 
& Mowday, 1993; Trevor et al., 1997); however, it has not been applied to research specifically 
addressing employee careers. 
Proportional hazards modeling has a number of advantages. First, proportional hazards 
modeling uses information on survival time (i.e., tenure), rather than relying solely on a simple 
dichotomous dependent variable, such as whether an employee changed jobs over a specific time span. 
This allowed us to examine information in each year rather than aggregating organizational effects over 
multiple time periods. Second, the proportional hazards model allowed us to differentiate between an 
employee who leaves in year one and an employee who leaves in year 5. Such information would be lost 
when treating employer changes simply as a dichotomous outcome. This is an important distinction, as 
some have noted that failure to consider the timing of employee job movements may result in biased 
findings (Morita et al., 1993). Third, proportional hazards modeling can control for censored data. In 
some cases, the exact survival time is unknown, although it is known to be greater than the specified 
value. Censoring occurs when the study ends without all the employees having moved to another job. In 
our study, most units are censored, such that we only know if executives move jobs as we track them 
across all jobs during the 5-year period in our study. If the effect of censoring was ignored, subsequent 
results would be biased; similarly, eliminating all censored data would drastically reduce the available 
sample and thus power. 
Because our independent variables (salary, rank, organizational performance, etc.) changed over 
time, for each individual, there were as many ‘‘lines’’ of data as there were yearly observations. Because 
we had yearly data, each observation (i.e., row of data) was a person-year. Each spell was coded as 1 if 
the ‘‘spell’’ of information was the last observation for the individual but the person did not leave the 
organization in that year. The final data set contained 813 person-year observations for 178 individuals. 
The general proportional hazards regression model was: 
h ( t ; x ) = h ( t ) exp[P1(Xcontrois) + (32(^individual data) + P3(^organizational data)], where 
h( t ; x) = the conditional movement probability at t ime t, wi th predictors x, 
h ( t ) = the baseline hazard function, 
(3s = the estimated regression weights, 
Xs = the explanatory variables. 
Positive beta coefficients signify that a greater value of X is positively related to a greater hazard 
rate. More specifically, a one-unit increase in an independent variable increases the odds of the 
executive moving according to the formula ([e@ — 1] X 1 0 0 % ) (Allison, 1995). 
3. Results 
Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and correlations of all the variables. The table 
is divided such that the data below the diagonal includes 178 executives with 813 person observations; 
that is, data per person from 1992 to 1997. Data above the diagonal includes a sample of 178 executives 
for their first year of complete data. Note that the data below the diagonal, which reports correlations 
for all person-years of data, is not independent (i.e., there are multiple lines of data for each person). As 
such, any results there should be interpreted with caution (and we do not interpret these results in our 
discussion below); however, for the sake of fully describing our data, we included these analyses for 
descriptive purposes. 
Table 1 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations of all variables 
Variable 
1. Mover 
2. Tenure in current 
3. Age 
4. Education 
5. Employees*'0 
job 
6. History of job changes 
7. Salarya'b'd 
8. Bonusa'b'd 
9. Other total 
compensationa,b,d 
10. Status 
11. ROA 
12. AROA 
13. Return to 
shareholders 
14. AReturn to 
shareholders 
First-year 
data 
0.51 (0.50) 
11.67(9.81) 
49.55 (5.87) 
1.75 (0.61) 
35.23 (43.24) 
2.75 (1.39) 
337.89 
(190.94) 
224.80 
(250.91) 
799.10 
(1864.09) 
3.34 (1.16) 
4.23 (6.59) 
-0.26 
(10.88) 
17.57(31.02) 
-3.05 
(43.88) 
Multipli 
observations 
0.08 
11.10 
51.50 
1.80 
34.45 
2.75 
421.17 
390.75 
1652.97 
3.50 
4.25 
-0.27 
18.35 
1.02 
(0.28) 
(10.36) 
(5.75) 
(0.59) 
(44.31) 
(1.39) 
(291.69) 
(624.18) 
(5421.81) 
(1.17) 
(7.48) 
(8.27) 
(32.72) 
(43.38) 
1 
- .39 
-.11 
.06 
-.10 
.14 
- .14 
- .02 
- .03 
.01 
-.11 
-.07 
- .02 
.01 
2 
-.19 
.19 
-.20 
.22 
-.59 
.12 
.05 
.00 
.02 
.13 
.02 
.03 
-.01 
3 
- .13 
.22 
.03 
.10 
.11 
.16 
.09 
.08 
.10 
- .02 
- .02 
-.04 
.00 
4 
.07 
-.10 
-.01 
.10 
.19 
.11 
.12 
.09 
.02 
.07 
.05 
.04 
.00 
5 
.00 
.24 
.15 
.02 
-.16 
.31 
.28 
.24 
-.05 
.08 
.00 
- .04 
- .02 
6 
.03 
-.60 
.06 
.16 
- .14 
-.06 
.03 
.02 
- .04 
-.09 
-.01 
.01 
.03 
7 
- .08 
.13 
.25 
.10 
.14 
-.07 
.43 
.42 
.31 
.04 
.04 
.11 
.01 
8 
-.01 
.07 
.03 
.10 
.29 
-.07 
.42 
.33 
.11 
.22 
.16 
.26 
.09 
9 
- .04 
.00 
.07 
.05 
.25 
- .05 
.33 
.30 
.29 
-.07 
- .15 
.09 
.00 
10 
-.06 
.04 
.07 
.02 
- .03 
.00 
.27 
.17 
.17 
-.09 
- .03 
.08 
.04 
11 
-.04 
.01 
-.06 
-.01 
-.02 
-.12 
.01 
.23 
-.12 
- .13 
.61 
.24 
.05 
12 
-.07 
-.08 
-.09 
.07 
-.11 
.00 
.03 
.14 
-.21 
.00 
.53 
.22 
.21 
13 
- .04 
.09 
-.11 
.02 
-.07 
-.09 
.13 
.21 
.07 
.11 
.03 
.01 
.64 
14 
- .03 
.07 
-.16 
.07 
.06 
.00 
.10 
.23 
.06 
.12 
-.07 
.19 
.63 
Note: All correlations above the diagonal are the first year of available data. All the correlations below the diagonal include data per executive per year from 1992 to 
1997. J V = 813 person observations (below the diagonal) p < .05 for all correlations greater than .07, J V = 178 executives (above the diagonal), p < .05 for all 
correlations greater than .15 and less than -.16. The means and standard deviations for data above the diagonal are in the First year data column (standard 
deviations in parentheses), whereas the means and standard deviations for data below the diagonal are in the Multiple observations column. 
a
 Raw data is used to calculate the means and standard deviations. However, due to the skewness of the data, natural logarithms are used for the remaining 
analyses. 
h
 Due to missing data in the three compensation measures, J V ^ ^ = 806 (below the diagonal) for the three compensation measures; N — 176 (above the diagonal) 
for the same measures. 
° In hundreds. 
d
 In thousand. 
Interestingly, the mean tenure for an executive within this entire sample is 11.67 years (SD = 
9.81), which is higher than the previously stated tenure of 7–8 years for executives (Charon & Colvin, 
1999). Note that the mean tenure of the executives that did not move within our sample was 13.64 
years (SD = 10.34), which is significantly different (p < .01) from the mean tenure of the movers within 
our sample (M = 9.79; SD = 8.73). It is also worth noting that the mean age of our subjects is 51.48 (SD = 
5.77). Traditional careers models might imply that the executives within this sample are all within the 
maintenance stages of the career cycle (Super, 1957). However, by the way we selected our sample (i.e., 
we are examining executive firm changers), it is unclear if career stage, approximated by age, would play 
a significant role. 
For the four hypotheses, proportional hazard analyses were used to estimate the probability of 
employee job movements. Three models were analyzed, as shown in Table 2. The first model includes 
the control variables (age, education, and number of employees in the organization). The second model 
includes the control and individual-level variables of company change history, salary, bonus, long-term 
compensation, and employee status. As indicated by the chi-squared difference, Model 2 is significantly 
more predictive than Model 1 (p < .0001). The third model adds the organizational-level variables to the 
analysis. The chi-square difference between model 2 and model 3 is statistically significant (p < .05). 
The models indicate a number of significant relationships, providing support for some of the 
hypotheses and also revealing some interesting findings. Because the third model was more predictive 
than the previous two, we examined its coefficients for further interpretation. It should first be noted 
that, consistent with traditional careers models, older employees are less likely to make job movements. 
The results also indicate that those with greater education are more likely to make job movements, and 
those in larger organizations are less likely to do so. 
Yet even after controlling for age, education, and organizational size, the models also provide 
strong support for hypothesis one (p < .0001). Those with a history of job movements are more likely to 
exhibit job movements during the 1992–1997 time frame. The second hypothesis predicted a negative 
relationship between the executive’s compensation and executive movement, but results were not 
consistent across compensation form. Higher salaries were negatively related to the likelihood of 
employer changes (p < .01), thus supporting hypothesis 2. However, we found no significant effect for 
bonus or other compensation. Thus, executives are less likely to move when they receive greater not-at-
risk pay, but greater contingent pay does not seem to be a force for executive retention. 
The third hypothesis stated that we expected a negative relationship between an executive’s 
status within the organization and executive movement. We did not find statistically significant results 
to support this hypothesis in any of the models. In fact, the coefficient was positive, and only marginally 
not significant (p < .10). This finding is not only counter to our hypothesis, but perhaps indicates that 
gaining organizational rank actually increases one’s visibility and marketability. The lack of statistical 
significance makes any comment on this result tentative, but it is an interesting finding that may merit 
deeper consideration. 
The fourth hypothesis predicted a negative relationship between the organization’s health and 
executive movement. Both the change in return to shareholders and the change in ROA were significant 
(both at p < .05) as predicted. That is, as organizations decline, these executives were more likely to 
move to other organizations. It should be noted, though, that the magnitude of the coefficients for the 
organizational health variables appears small. A one-unit decrease in either variable increases the odds 
of turnover by roughly 1% and 0.2%, respectively. Thus, small changes in ROA or return to shareholder 
value are not expected to have dramatic effects on turnover; however, if the changes are sizable—such 
as 5.68 for ROA or 58.8 for return to shareholder value, the 90th percentiles in our sample—the effect 
on predicted turnover is to increase it by 5% and 12%, respectively. While not overwhelming, these 
effects can accumulate to have quite dramatic results for practice. They also show that large changes in 
organizational health are associated with personnel changes at the executive level. 
3.1. Supplemental analyses: Consequences of job movements 
In addition to the hypothesis tests, we examined the consequences of employee job 
movements. Post-hoc t-tests revealed that movers were more likely to receive a positive change in 
rank/status in the year that they moved than non-movers (p < .0001). Further, these t-tests revealed 
that changes in compensation were notable, with organizational changers enjoying an average increase 
of $197,000 in salary and $202,000 in bonus, compared to average increases of $21,000 in salary and 
$64,000 in bonus for non-movers (statistically significant at p < .0001 for salary and p < .05 for bonuses). 
Interestingly, movers had significantly lower other compensation, losing an average of $808,000 with a 
move, whereas stayers received an average gain of $883,000 (significantly different at p < .05). Note, 
however, that this should not be surprising, as other compensation largely consists of long-term awards, 
such as stock options and grants. Changing employers forces an executive to forgo this compensation, 
and time must pass before an executive can accumulate comparable awards at a new employer. It is 
important to note that this finding is not contradictory to hypothesis #2. That is, the proportional 
hazards models indeed show that greater salary is associated with retaining executives, as evidenced in 
their lower probability of switching jobs. Nonetheless, we also found that those who move do reap the 
rewards of such movements in the form of greater changes to their base and bonus pay, and enhanced 
organizational status relative to their prior rank. 
4. Discussion 
While no study can conclusively determine causality, the results from our longitudinal analyses 
do provide strong support for the overarching concepts from both the traditional careers model and the 
boundaryless careers concept. Although executives are often seen as different from other employee 
populations, our results for this sample are consistent with predictions of traditional careers models 
(i.e., Schein, 1978; Super, 1957; Veiga, 1983). That is, age is negatively related to employer movements, 
and one’s history of firm changes is positively related to employer movements (Cooper, Graham, & 
Dyke, 1993; Sheridan, Slocum, Buda, & Thompson, 1990; Veiga, 1983). Additionally, similar to other 
groups (e.g., Brett & Stroh, 1997; Topel & Ward, 1992), job movements appear to be a highly effective 
means to increase compensation. Thus, executives may have mean levels of some qualities that are 
different from other groups of employees with regard to careers (i.e., more previous employers, higher 
mean salary, higher mean age), a perspective that merits future research, but our results suggest that 
their behaviors do not necessarily require different career models from other employees. 
What is interesting in our results, however, is that the executive movements also support 
boundaryless career concepts as a relevant overall framework. Results imply that in managing their 
careers, these individuals seek opportunities to maximize their extrinsic rewards, specifically their salary 
and bonus. If these executives experience a decline in the health of their organizations, they are also 
more apt to change employers. Indeed, some executives will move to get the salary/rank they desire, 
decreasing loyalty towards any one organization. Thus, our results provide a window into career 
patterns at the executive-level. 
In addition, our post-hoc analyses provide greater insight into the results of career movements. 
That is, it appears to be a useful strategy for executives to actively manage their careers by switching the 
organizations with whom they work. Doing so enables them to realize higher levels of salary, bonus, and 
status. Thus, our overall findings suggest that compensation is a very relevant factor associated with an 
executive’s propensity to switch organizations. 
This study also makes important contributions methodologically to the study of careers. While 
there are a number of career-based articles that present and discuss concepts of boundaryless careers 
(i.e., Arthur & Rousseau, 1996; Briscoe & Hall, 2006; Inkson, 2006; Sullivan &Arthur, 2006), there are 
only a few studies that empirically examine career issues using this framework (e.g., Briscoe, Hall,& 
DeMuth, 2005; Eby et al., 2003; Singh & Greenhaus, 2004). These studies, which present provocative 
findings that provide insights as to the nature and implications of boundaryless careers, relied on 
survey-based data. In contrast, our study employed data that enabled us to examine similar concepts 
longitudinally. In doing so, we provide additional insights as to the degree to which individuals enact 
boundaryless careers, an issue recently emphasized by Briscoe and Hall (2006). In addition, our design 
allowed us to examine specific quantitative drivers and consequences of career-decisions versus the 
self-reported, attitudinal data used in prior studies. Thus, we view the methodological design employed 
in this study as a strength of our research, as it triangulates with the existing empirical work on 
boundaryless careers. The longitudinal data also allows us to differentiate between the drivers of 
organizational changes (such as number of previous jobs held, salary, and organizational health) and the 
consequences of organizational changes (which includes bonus and organizational status). 
The findings of this study, though, are tempered by a number of limitations. Most notably, we 
relied on archival data to assess factors influencing executive movement across organizations. 
Subjective measures for career success such as career satisfaction, social networks, job satisfaction, and 
psychological mobility were not considered within this study. These factors are certainly relevant and 
may indeed influence executives’ job movements in tandem with executives’ perceived pay and status 
levels. While our findings suggest that the extrinsic, empirical factors we examined are important, future 
studies that explore the impact of the composite package of both intrinsic and extrinsic factors on 
executive job movements would be an important way to extend the findings of this study. Nonetheless, 
we make an initial step in better understanding the relationship between crucial career factors and 
executive career patterns over time and in doing so, answer Arthur et al. (2005) call for work that sheds 
additional light on career mobility patterns, especially between organizations. 
In addition, this study focused on archival and biographical factors that may be associated with 
and explain executive movement. In practice, many forces may influence executive movements from 
one organization to another. If future research could expand upon this method by also collecting 
attitudinal data from job movers and non-movers, a more complete understanding on the causes of job 
movement could be developed. However, the difficulties associated with collecting longitudinal 
attitudinal data from executives, and being able to predict a priori a large enough sample of job movers, 
may make such research impractical. This study goes beyond many other studies on executives by using 
data from multiple sources. Rather than relying solely on the ExecuComp database, the news releases 
and other biographical sources provided a more detailed examination of executives than researchers 
have previously used. 
The study of careers is very important and while emerging research is making valuable 
contributions, the domain is full of new propositions (see Briscoe & Hall, 2006; Sullivan & Arthur, 2006 
for a discussion) and empirical studies focused on employee preferences (i.e., Briscoe et al., 2005; Eby et 
al., 2003; Singh & Greenhaus, 2004). In our study, by considering the actual career changes made by 
executives, by examining compensation and rank changes over time, and by studying a set of individual, 
job, and organizational factors, we make an important contribution to the study of the impact of 
extrinsic rewards on executives’ mobility patterns. An understanding of mobility patterns, specifically 
inter-organizational career mobility, has often been overlooked in prior careers research (Arthur et al., 
2005).Our findings suggest that in future studies that examine why and how executives cross-over 
organizational boundaries (or remain with their companies), extrinsic rewards, such as compensation, 
status, and organizational health are important factors that should not be overlooked. 
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